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NLSIR

GENDER, ALTERITY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: FREEDOM IN A
FISHBOWL (BOOK REVIEW)
—Rashmi Venkatesan*

Ratna Kapur’s book, Gender, Alterity and Human Rights: Freedom in a
Fishbowl, is a much needed, well timed, radical critique of the current human
rights praxis. While Kapur does acknowledge the value of liberal rights,
she argues that they “cannot give us what we do want – that is, freedom”.1
It makes an impassioned case for looking both beyond and away from human
rights as a means to achieving human freedom. Kapur’s book is an invitation
for human rights critics and practitioners to imagine other possibilities of freedom, to explore other ways of ‘being’ free, and ultimately to escape the liberal
‘fishbowl’ of human rights. Locating itself “in the aftermath of the critique of
human rights”, the book sets an ambitious yet critical task for itself, i.e, what
next? Or, what else, if not human rights?
The book is foregrounded in a feminist critique of the philosophy, practice, and politics of human rights today. Human rights rests on the belief that
only its genuine pursuit will ensure human freedom. The hegemony lies in the
assertion that first, the only legitimate understanding of freedom, and the only
one which is worthy of pursuit, is a liberal freedom. Within this paradigm,
freedom is conceived as a progressive, external pursuit carried out by a thinking, individual subject. Second, this understanding alone is, and can, be universally desirable – human rights as something “we cannot not want”. And third,
that the only means of realising this freedom is by a relentless accumulation
of ‘rights’ by an individual, against state and society. Kapur argues that critical scholarship of human rights is stuck within this metaphorical ‘fishbowl’ of
human rights, and is either reluctant to look outside it, or unable to find viable
alternatives to the same.
Due to the human rights lens being fixed firmly inside this fishbowl, Kapur
argues that all other non-liberal, non-western understanding, philosophies, and
imaginations of human freedom are viewed with suspicion, and thus marginalised. By viewing anything ‘cultural’ as inherently traditional, primitive, and
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therefore as an affront to the liberal idea of freedom, human rights, similar to
colonialism, constantly propagates categories of the enlightened ‘us’ and the
primitive ‘other’. Human rights, instead of being a project of freedom, becomes
a vehicle of global, imperialist, hegemony of “Empire Lite”. However, instead
of being a plea to abandon human rights, the book argues that engagement
with it is absolutely critical, not because it will give us freedom, but rather
because it is part of governance that often leads to unfreedoms.
The book makes its argument in broadly two parts: first, by developing a
systematic critique of the current human rights praxis by looking at LGBT
advocacy, sexual violence, and the ‘veil’ cases in France. Each of these cases
that the book explores highlights a different yet related critique of the human
rights regime; and second, by delving into other philosophies of freedom, specifically Mahayana Buddhism, Shi’ism, and Advaita, she directs our attention
to other possible epistemes outside of the liberal fishbowl that could enable
freedom.
Although applicable universally, human rights is based on its own logics of
inclusion and exclusion – “of who counts as human and who does not; who is
more or less human; who is non-human or inconceivable as human”.2 Kapur
analyses how human rights creates a binary narrative of the helpless victim
on the one hand, who is unable or unwillingly to embrace freedom, and the
enlightened and empowered, rights pursuing subject on the other. The most
compelling example of this, she argues, are cases of Muslim women wearing
the veil, and how veiled women are almost always seen as victims of their
culture and religion. This victimhood is constructed within the liberal imagination of gender equality, which sees the free and liberated woman as necessarily unveiled, individualistic, and sexual. For women who choose to wear
the veil, their choices are often disregarded as false consciousness or illegitimate. Human rights, therefore, Kapur contends, is more about rescuing Muslim
women from Muslim men, rather than pursuing the freedom of Muslim women
as they see it. She is quick to remind us of its similarity to colonialism that
relied on tropes such as the ‘natives’ treatment of their women’ to justify colonial interventions.
What the human rights discourse has enabled is a discourse of the enlightened and liberated West, pitted against a regressive non-western culture – its
‘other’. Within the present social atmosphere of growing Islamophobia, the veil,
which earlier stood for the vulnerability and victimhood of Muslim women,
has now increasingly come to symbolise the Muslim threat, and the act of
unveiling has consequently come to symbolise the neutralisation of that threat.
Similarly, in Cologne, where hundreds of women were sexually assaulted during New Year’s Eve, Kapur demonstrates how, although only 3 of the 58 men
charged were immigrants, it triggered an anti-immigrant response and rhetoric
2
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– where the ‘outsiders’ posed a threat to the values and freedoms of white
women.
The book uses the 2012 Delhi gang rape case to throw light onto how rape
within the ‘violence against women’ framework was captured as the state’s
failure to provide security for its women. In doing so, the protection of human
rights fits squarely into a governance regime, where the state is strengthened in
order to ensure women’s safety. Kapur shows how the human rights discourse
on gender equality and sexual violence has enabled the control and monitoring of women’s bodies, which has led to more unfreedoms while validating a
hegemonic imperialist regime of governance.
Kapur’s critique holds significance for a number of human rights concerns.
While she alludes to human rights facilitating neoliberalism and a construction of state within it, the book does not spend too much time elaborating on
this argument. It is, nonetheless, an extremely useful critique of Corporate
Social Responsibility (‘CSR’) and ‘business and human rights’ (‘BnHR’),3
– as discourses that posit to use human rights as a check on neoliberal globalisation, but in reality enable the same. CSR regarding labour monitoring
in global supply chains has grown in leaps and bounds since its emergence
1990s. International brands no longer deny responsibility towards workers in
their supply chains as they did a few decades ago, but rather show themselves
to be proactive in their human rights compliance. Today, corporations are integral to the human rights discourse and the setting of its agenda. At first flush,
these developments might seem to indicate corporate enlightenment. However,
a closer look reveals that human rights does more to sustain neoliberal globalisation than check it. There are many parallels to be drawn between CSR and
the critique that Kapur presents in her book.

I. LABOUR AND HUMAN RIGHTS
As cross-border trade and commerce increased manifold under neoliberalism, so did the global reach of economic actors – especially corporations.
However, corresponding changes in the international legal regime to regulate these transnational entities and monitor their adverse impacts were woefully inadequate. Civil society groups increasingly began demanding a global
regulatory system to monitor corporations, punish erring ones, and compensating their victims. After initially resisting and dismissing such demands,
3
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non-violation of human rights. However, the UNGPs in making human rights as a universal
minimum, have integrated these strands to a fair degree; A. Ramasastry, Corporate Social
Responsibility Versus Business and Human Rights: Bridging the Gap Between Responsibility
and Accountability”, 14(2) Journal of Human R ights 237-259.
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corporations later responded to these demands by making public commitments and starting initiatives to monitor labour conditions within their supply chains. Broadly known as CSR, these commitments and obligations were
entirely voluntary, unenforceable, and led by companies. Over the years, the
CSR regime has seen various mechanisms such as multi-stakeholder initiatives (‘MSIs’), audits, and certifications emerge. Typically, these are created
by western multinationals or transnational advocacy networks (‘TANs’) that
monitor working conditions in factories located in manufacturing countries
like India, China, Turkey, Bangladesh, etc., that manufacture their commodities. Eventually, human rights standards began to be incorporated within these
CSR instruments as a common minimum standard. With the adoption of the
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 2011 (‘UNGPs’), which
highlight a ‘responsibility to respect’ human rights on businesses, those human
rights included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (‘UDHR’),
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’), International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘ICESCR’) and Core
Labour Standards (‘CLS’), became universally applicable standards for supply
chain governance. What is interesting to note is the widespread endorsement of
the UNGPs by corporations and international economic institutions the world
over, making it the gold standard of human rights obligations on businesses.
While BnHR has generated some positive outcomes, such as the increased
monitoring of factory floors and reduction in instances of child labour, it is
incapable of ensuring greater freedoms for workers. An in-depth critique of
CSR and BnHR is not intended here. However, what is sought to be noted is
that many of the critiques that Kapur highlights in her book apply to BnHR.
Instead of correcting the excesses of globalisation, human rights are part of the
neoliberal global governance regime.
The logic of CSR is moulded within the logic of the market. Corporate
gurus often make a ‘business case’ for it. In other words, CSR is argued as
‘good business’ that will sustain the long-term profitability of businesses –
by building a popular public profile and boosting company image, mitigating
risks such as consumer boycotts, and helping companies handle adverse public
scrutiny better.4 The market logic of CSR has permeated to all levels of the
supply chain, and increasingly even states. Social compliance has turned into
a marketable commodity. Suppliers advertise their social compliance record to
enhance their commercial standing amongst buyers.
Considering that CSR is a discourse driven by big multinationals and international civil society organisations, this is inevitable – they drive the intellectual discourse, set the agenda, create implementation mechanisms, and manage
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these initiatives.5 Therefore, governance of global production through human
rights is viewed with suspicion by domestic capital, states, and trade unions.
For instance, the issue of ‘social clauses’ in trade agreements provoked the
accusation of being protectionist and imperialist against developing countries
by local actors. It is not western companies and NGOs, argued local (read
‘nationalist’) employers and governments, but ‘they’ who can best take care of
‘their’ workers.6
This criticism is usually sought to be bolstered by drawing parallels
between BnHR and labour welfare during colonialism. For instance, in countries like India, most factory and labour legislations were enacted during colonialism, and were imitations of legislations prevailing in England.7 By showing
to promote labour welfare the colonial regime sought to legitimise colonial
capitalism as a source of good. However, factory legislations were also used
to equalise the labour cost by standardising working conditions between mills
in India and Manchester, thereby neutralising India’s comparative advantage in
low labour cost.8 Local trade unions and some national leaders like Dadabhai
Naoroji rejected these as protectionist. Therefore, governance of global commodity production through human rights is seen similarly today by local actors
as a project of “Empire Lite”.
BnHR reinforces the neoliberal faith in markets and its construction of
states – that markets are self-regulating; that only self-regulation is effective, democratic, desirable and sustainable; and that the only duty of states is
to facilitate the smooth functioning of markets. Governing markets through
human rights is an exercise in realising the ideal liberal market as the only true
guarantor of freedom. The UNGPs are premised on this understanding that
economic development and rule of law, promoted by globalisation, is “the best
guarantor for the entire spectrum of human rights: from civil and political, to
economic, social, and cultural rights”.9 Therefore, devising instruments of corporate and public governance is argued as the core challenge of globalisation
in order to address its adverse impacts and sustain it as a positive force.10
5
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The actors in this narrative are the ones that Kapur portrays in her book–
the worker victim, the abusive local supplier, and the enlightened TANs or
CSR savvy corporations. The workers in this discourse, like the veiled Muslim
women in France, are the victims who needs rescuing – not from capitalism
or the market, but from agents who do not allow their ‘free’ participation in it.
The BnHR discourse does not imagine freedom, especially for the worker, as
being outside capitalism, but only through it. It seeks to create an environment
that enables the active participation of all people in the labour market. Its topdown structure deprives workers of the agency to define the meaning of their
liberation, and create mechanisms that best secure it.
If the worker is the victim, the site of violation is the factory floor, and the
perpetrator is usually the local supplier within the CSR narrative who has to
be monitored, educated, and sometimes punished. It is, therefore, focused on
monitoring workplaces, primarily factories, where the monitoring is done by
international buyers – brands like Apple, Adidas, Nike, Nestle, etc. – and the
monitored is the local manufacturer. Drawing a parallel to Kapur’s argument
regarding the veil and gender equality, what CSR effectively does is save the
local worker from the local supplier, who, far-removed from human rights,
exploits workers in a bid to extract the most profits. The supplier represents
the ‘local’ – as part of an unorganised, impoverished, and unskilled economic
system – and not as an integral part of the ‘global’ capitalist commodity production and consumption. Ignoring the integrated nature and interdependence
of different suppliers within a supply chain, BnHR and CSR mechanisms make
global capital monitor indigenous capital in order to protect local workers – as
if they can and they will.11
Therefore, within the CSR paradigm, the enlightened human rights subject
is the ‘corporate citizen’ who is either voluntary accepts human rights responsibilities, or is shamed into doing so by TANs. Most of the prevalent CSR
mechanisms are created, funded, and managed (partly or substantially) by big
consumer brands – the same entities that create global supply chains to reduce
cost and profit from a global environment of exploitation. Exploitative supply
chains are profitable supply chains – for all businesses in the production hierarchy. Fixing human rights responsibilities on big corporations may improve
certain corporate practices. However, it has also made global capital as the
custodian of human rights of third world workers. The triumph of CSR reinforces the belief that the neoliberal market is enlightened, can self-regulate,
and that only such self-regulation is effective and sustainable in the long run.
It does so by projecting regulatory possibilities as limited to either state-led
mechanisms or private voluntary ones. The only ‘choice’ that is presented to
workers is who is a better provider of human rights – states or markets? Given
11
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that states are already discarded as failed projects under neoliberalism, markets
remain the only legitimate site of regulation.
Talking of workers’ liberation and well-being within a human rights paradigm has allowed exploitation to be conceptualised at the level of the firm
without taking into account the global economic laws and institutions that create conditions that allow and incentivise unfreedoms at work. Human rights
is weaved into the logic of neoliberalism, and it has been largely ineffective
to make any systemic improvements in workers’ lives or bring them closer to
freedom.

II. LOOKING OUTSIDE THE FISHBOWL
The human rights critique offered by Kapur is compelling and radical. Its
significance goes beyond just human rights, and extends to other regimes of
liberal rights. For instance, constitutional fundamental rights are also expressions of liberal rights and many of the book’s critiques of human rights apply
to constitutional law as well. The recent controversy surrounding women’s
entry into Sabrimala following the Supreme Court’s decision holding the
ban on women’s entry into the shrine as unconstitutional, is a case in point.
Without getting into an elaboration of the case or the controversies surrounding it, it suffices to say that Kapur’s critique and analysis provides an essential framework within which to view the debate –the narratives of victimhood,
empowerment and freedom, women’s entry to the temple as a clash between
western liberalism and cultural protectionism, and the pursuit of gender equality through constitutional rights secured by the state. Kapur’s work enables
more than just criticism or support of the judgment. It explains and critiques
the modes of operation of liberal rights, the fault lines it draws, and the inclusions and exclusions it creates.
While most critical scholars look within the human rights system for solutions and seek alternate possibilities within this ‘fishbowl’, Kapur not only
challenges the foundational philosophy of human rights, but also valiantly
takes on the onerous task of looking at other non-liberal non-western epistemes
of freedom. In the second part of the book, she analyses Sedgwick’s exploration of Mahayana Buddhism and Foucault’s concept of ‘political spirituality’ in
the context of Shi’ism as instances of previous excursions into other philosophical traditions of freedom. In her last chapter on ‘Freedom from the Fishbowl’,
Kapur turns to Advaita as a philosophy of non-dualism that could offer possibilities of realising freedom and happiness. In making this argument, Kapur
dismantles not only the narrow liberal conception of ‘cultural relativism’, but
also the regressive strands within the ‘cultural relativist’ school.
Such explorations, while never perfect and still nascent, are indeed critical
as they offer a different way of thinking about some of the ‘sticky’ issues of
human rights. For instance, the question of ‘individual versus collective’ rights
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can never be satisfactorily resolved in favour of all actors within the liberal
paradigm. This is because, within it, the individual is constructed as a finite
individual in a unilateral pursuit to be freedom against an ‘external’ society.
Advaita, on other hand, rejects this duality and provides a different episteme of
‘being’– as a continuum of knowledge and consciousness.
While an epistemological engagement with liberalism and human rights is
essential to develop a radical critique (and in this respect Kapur’s book is compelling and important), it does not shed light on how these philosophical traditions would challenge and check the current governance regime. Similarly,
while Kapur does show that there are other legitimate articulations of liberation which cannot be dismissed as either status-quo-ist or regressive, what
remains unclear is the method of ‘finding’ these ‘right’ alternative epistemologies and philosophical traditions – an exercise that is inherently normative and
contentious.
Does the process of looking for these non-liberal alternative necessarily
have to be grounded in an alternative historical realm, be it religion, culture,
or philosophy? Is there a possibility of imagining and creating new models of
freedom and well-being unhindered by the past?
Perversions and divisions are known to creep into the purest of ideas with
their practice overtime. How do we deal with alternative registers of inclusion
and exclusion that these ‘other’ traditions might create – either in their (pure or
perverted version of) philosophy and/or practice?
If freedom in to be found within (where ‘within’, i.e., ‘I’ is not in opposition
to the ‘outside’ as Advaita argues), then is it possible or perhaps even desirable to embark on meta-narratives of ‘freedom’, ‘justice’, ‘equality’, and the like,
and meta projects such as human rights, international law, humanitarian law?
And more pressingly, how do we start moving on from this impasse that
Kapur argues human rights is currently in and how do we deal with similar
liberal rights regimes like constitutional rights? Can we engage with them in
any way other than as a governance project?
None of these questions are meant as a justification for staying within the
‘fishbowl’. Rather, these are the hard questions that demand answers if we need
to move beyond the ‘fishbowl’. While Kapur’s book as a critique of human
rights is highly valuable, her arguments on alternatives appear esoteric at this
stage. She does prod her readers into engaging with the philosophical and epistemological basis of human rights, but a collective journey outside the fishbowl
still seems fairly distant.

